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INTRODUCTION 
Americans apparently dislike small wars even more than they do big 
ones. A majority of the public supports major U.S. commitments to the 
defense of Western Europe and Japan but opposes the use of American 
forces in nearly every conceivable small war contingency.1 Despite an 
undeserved popular reputation for bellicosity, the American military ap-
pears equally, if not more, reluctant to become involved in low-intensity 
warfare. Reflecting this concern, Secretary of Defense Weinberger in a 
1984 speech outlined a series of tests which should be satisfied before the 
U.S. committed troops to combat; these included a "vital national in-
terest" at stake, the support of the American public, and willingness to 
commit whatever force was needed to win.2 Taken together, these condi-
tions would probably rule out most small war commitments, including 
invasion of Grenada, which Weinberger had endorsed the year before.3 
Certainly all can endorse Secretary Weinberger's emphasis on the 
moral imperative of restraint where human lives are at stake. But why 
more aversion to small wars than to big ones? The answer seems to be in 
a belief that small wars present unique, perhaps insurmountable, 
obstacles to success for the United States. Thomas Schelling, in a 1981 
Vietnam post mortem, went so far as to assert that "Khruschev was right 
in 1960. He said that democracies were soft and could not fight against 
wars of national liberation."4 
Schelling's conclusion lacks historical perspective and ignores 
American successes in a number of small wars, including some pro-
tracted and difficult engagements. Yet he is correct in asserting that small 
wars do pose difficult problems for Americans, particularly in the post-
World War II era. The present research is aimed toward testing several 
explanations for success and failure in small wars through a systematic 
examination of fifteen low-intensity conflicts since 1898. 
EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE: SOME HYPOTHESES 
As Sam Sarkesian points out, few works on the topic of American 
small wars take a comparative perspective.5 Most fall into one of two 
categories: straightforward, non-theoretical studies of pre-Vietnam 
wars; or the host of works devoted to explaining the Vietnam debacle. 
Studies of the first type usually attempt no general conclusions while the 
second variety tend to treat Vietnam as a paradigm for all small wars and 
draw their lessons accordingly. Two exceptions are Sarkesian's own 
work, which examines five small wars from the Second Seminole War of 
1835-42 to Vietnam, and Larry Cable's study of American post-World 
War II counterinsurgency doctrine.6 Both reach interesting conclusions 
but are difficult to compare since they cover different time periods. 
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Despite the lack of theoretical focus in this literature, a number of 
testable hypotheses may be drawn from the past works. One of the most 
important comes from some adherents of the "realist" school of interna-
tional politics. Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and others have 
argued that America's Vietnam policy was doomed by its lack of rela-
tionship to the U.S. "national interest," which they define in terms of 
politics.7 According to these writers, the U.S. had an interest in preven-
ting Chinese domination of Asia but none in the internal politics of Viet-
nam; hence American intervention there was inappropriate. Moreover 
the policy was doomed to fail, for policy makers would sooner or later 
realize that the game was not worth the cost and pull out.8 
Andrew Mack, in a discussion of why big nations lose small wars, 
suggests that the realist critique of Vietnam may apply generally to large 
states in conflict with small ones. Since the large state's power would not 
be seriously threatened by the victory of the small opponent, the large 
state has less stake in winning and a correspondingly lowered propensity 
to make the sacrifices necessary for victory.' Weinberger reflected a con-
cern for this problem when he insisted that "the United States not com-
mit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occa-
sion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our own allies."10 
Thus, a realist hypothesis on U.S. success in small wars might be stated 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The United States is likely to be successful 
in a small war when it has a major power interest at 
stake and unsuccessful when it does not. 
Of course, making this hypothesis intelligible requires a definition 
of U.S. "interests." Generations of realist writers have asserted that the 
U.S. has an interest in preventing instability in Latin America which 
might lead to intervention by some extra-hemispheric power, but not in 
the internal affairs of the Latin American states. Since World War II, 
realists have also argued that U.S. security interests require preserving a 
power balance in Europe and Asia, preventing one-nation dominance 
and more recently, maintaining access to Middle East oil reserves." The 
present analysis accepts this definition as a heuristic device; interventions 
which serve realist goals are defined as serving a "major interest" of the 
United States. 
Some scholars argue that economic interests drive U.S. foreign 
policy. This would indicate the necessity of inducting economic ties 
(trade, investment, etc.) as a second measure of interests. However, in 
many cases the U.S. has intervened in countries where American 
economic interests were negligible. One might argue, as Magdoff does, 
that intervention in economically insignificant countries is aimed at 
preventing leftist revolutions from spreading to more important ones.12 
However, this would mean that all interventions served American, or at 
least American capitalist, interests, making it impossible to explain the 
failure to intervene in many other conflicts. 
A second group of analysts, also strongly influenced by the Vietnam 
period, believe that the support of the American public is vital to any 
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successful small war effort. Sam Sarkesian, in his study of five "forgot-
ten wars," asserts that "military interventions and the conduct of 
military operations must have some degree of support from and approval 
of political actors and the public" and that "the withdrawal or 
withholding of such support can lead to the erosion of the military's 
sense of mission and decreased combat effectiveness, as was, the case in 
Vietnam."13 Sarkesian acknowledges, however, that public support has 
not been equally vital in all small wars, because some have been remote 
from the public view. Speaking of the campaigns against the Moros in 
the southern Philippines from 1903-1913, he notes that "little was 
heard" of the fighting because "it was low-visibility conflict and involv-
ed only the Regular Army.'"4 According to this view if a war is both visi-
ble to the public and unpopular, the chances for success decline. The 
Sarkesian hypothesis can be stated as: 
Hypothesis 2: The U.S. is likely to be successful in a 
small war when the war is either invisible to the public 
or popular, and unsuccessful when the war is un-
popular. 
On the other hand, many observers see public support as more the 
result than the cause of a successful small war. Mueller, and more recent-
ly Cotton, have shown that popular support for wars, and especially 
small wars, invariably starts at a high level and declines as the cost of the 
conflict, particular in terms of battle deaths, rises." Mueller argues for a 
logarithmic relationship in which support falls rapidly in response to the 
first reports of heavy casualties, then levels off as the public becomes 
"hardened" to the losses. Supporting this view, Ernest May argues that 
"protracted and inconclusive ground warfare will not command public 
support."16 Thus, the U.S. cannot afford to pursue a stalemate or attri-
tion strategy, as in Vietnam, very long without a severe public reaction. 
However, rapid military successes will almost guarantee public support. 
Hypothesis 3: All small wars are popular when initiated; 
popular support is lost when U.S. forces incur high 
costs without achieving their objectives. 
According to another theory, American performance in small wars 
is best explained by the ethos and institutional structure of the American 
military rather than by the attitudes of the American public. According 
to many analysts, the U.S. Army, once a "light" fighting force, has 
developed a strong distaste for counterinsurgency warfare. One study 
found that most army officers were opposed to preparing for counterin-
surgent wars, despite believing that the U.S. was likely to become involv-
ed in such wars in the future.17 In Vietnam, this mentality is said to have 
led to the army fighting as if it were on the plains of central Europe. 
Army operations "in South Vietnam were oriented overwhelmingly 
toward . . . mid-intensity conflict, big unit operations and minimization 
of U.S. casualties through heavy firepower."111 Most analysts agree that 
this approach had a disastrous effect on the "other war" of pacification. 
Indiscriminate use of firepower led to heavy civilian casualties and severe 
22 
Conflict Quarterly 
refugee problems which blunted efforts to win the support of the South 
Vietnamese people." 
Capabilities for unconventional warfare were upgraded by the 
Reagan administration but deep-rooted institutional biases are hard to 
change.20 If the military is indeed reluctant to adopt viable counterin-
surgent tactics, it should have been difficult for the U.S. to succeed in 
small guerrilla wars, especially in the post-World War II period. In small 
conflicts where conventional tactics were suitable this disability should 
vanish. Hence: 
Hypothesis 4: The United States will do better in small 
conventional wars, and worse in small guerrilla wars. 
The disparity will increase after 1945. 
Another set of theories focus not on U.S. behavior but on that of 
other players in the small war drama. The U.S. is frequently criticized for 
intervening on behalf of weak, corrupt or ineffective regimes, primarily 
in the Third World. Richard Barnet has developed this point into a 
general argument for nonintervention in Third World revolutions, argu-
ing that any regime which needs American assistance against an internal 
revolt must be so riddled with corruption and social injustice as to be un-
salvageable, and indeed not worth saving.21 Robert Komer, writing from 
a very different political perspective, acknowledges that "the greatest 
single constraint on United States ability to achieve its aims in Vietnam 
was the comparative weakness of the regimes we backed."22 Similar con-
cerns have been raised about U.S. allies in other parts of the world, 
notably in Central America. This analysis leads to a fifth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The U.S. will be successful when it goes 
to the aid of a strong and effective local regime and un-
successful when it tries to assist a regime which is 
politically or militarily weak. 
A further group of analysts focus on the behavior of nations other 
than America's local allies or opponents. It is argued that small powers 
can often frustrate big ones in a small war if they receive adequate 
assistance from another big power. Richard Pipes, urging the U.S. to aid 
anti-Soviet guerrillas, contended that "experience indicates that a well-
led and motivated, guerrilla force, assisted from outside, is virtually im-
mune to suppression."23 Some analysts of Vietnam attribute America's 
defeat there more to Soviet and Chinese aid to the North Vietnamese 
than to American errors.24 On the other hand, the U.S. has sought allies 
to assist it in many of its interventions, and this might be thought to 
enhance the chances of success. Indeed in Korea and Vietnam both fac-
tors were at work contemporaneously, raising the question of which 
might be more important. Given the emphasis in some of the literature 
on the importance of aid to the enemy, it is hypothesized that this would 
generally outweigh any allied contribution in a small war. 
Hypothesis 6: The U.S. is less likely to be successful in a 
small war when its adversary receives outside aid. 
Assistance to the U.S. from allies will contribute to suc-
cess but not balance aid to our adversary. 
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SMALL WARS SINCE 1898: AN EXAMINATION 
Testing these hypotheses by examining all of Americans small wars 
(over 200 since 1789) would be a formidable task indeed. The present 
analysis is less ambitious, being based on a review of fifteen small wars 
selected from the period 1898-1984. By excluding wars before 1898, the 
analysis excludes all the Indian wars which were fought under conditions 
unlikely to appear in the future. Also excluded are the many shows-of-
force and demonstrations which did not end in combat, such as the one 
in Panama in 1903 and Lebanon in 1958, as well as raids and other "in 
and out" actions such as that recently occurring in Nicaragua which did 
not involved U.S. forces in a direct combat role.25 The study includes all 
the cases since 1898 where the United States engaged in direct, sustained 
but small-scale military intervention in support of its foreign policy 
goals. 
The results presented in Table 1 are based upon a search of the ex-
tensive literature on the fifteen wars. All fifteen have had books, parts of 
books, or articles devoted to them though there is a wide disparity in the 
availability of source material. The literature on Korea and Vietnam is, 
of course, immense and quite a bit has been written about the Philippine 
War of 1899-1902 and the two interventions in Nicaragua. By contrast, 
evidence on conflicts like the Caco War in Haiti in 1918-19 or the 1903-13 
Moro campaigns in the southern Philippines is rather sketchy. In all 
cases, however, the data appear sufficient to make some judgements 
about what conditions have led to success or failure for the Unites States 
in small wars. 
INTERESTS AND WARS 
According to Hypothesis 1, the United States will be successful in 
small wars when its major interests—excluding other powers from the 
Western Hemisphere and preventing single nation dominance in Europe 
and Asia—are at stake. For most of the wars surveyed, there is little 
evidence that this was the case. A plausible threat to the Monroe Doc-
trine could have justified the two interventions in Mexico, the Huerta 
regime ousted in 1914 was backed by the British government and oil in-
terests, and the Germans backed Pancho Villa's adventures in 
1916-1917." A case can also be made for the First Nicaraguan Interven-
tion in 1912, prompted by the threat of the Nicaraguan Liberal Party to 
permit the Japanese to construct a transisthmian canal in Nicaragua, 
which might well have developed into a threat to the U.S. canal in 
Panama.27 
Beyond these cases, there is little evidence that major American in-
terests were involved in most of the interventions. The invasion of the 
Philippines (1899-1902) and the subsequent conquest of the Moros 
(1903-13) were imperialist ventures prompted by a perceived "civilizing 
mission" unrelated to American security.28 The expeditions to China and 
the Second Nicaraguan Intervention of 1927-33 were aimed primarily at 
protecting American lives and property in those countries. President 
Wilson more or less blundered into intervention in Russia; American 
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U.S. SMALL WARS 1898-1983 
War 
1. Philippine 
War, 1899-
1902 
U.S. 
Goal 
Colonize 
Philippines 
Outcome 
Success 
U.S. Adversary 
Power Interest Receives Aid 
Peripheral No 
Friendly 
Local 
Regime 
None 
Invol 
With 
Allies 
No 
2. Boxer 
Rebellion, 
1900 
Rescue 
citizens in 
Beijing, 
pacify China 
Success Peripheral No None No 
3. Moro 
War 1903-
1913 
Pacify Moros 
in Southern 
Philippines 
Success Peripheral No None No 
4. 
5. 
First 
Nicaragua 
Intervention 
1912 
Veracruz 
Expedition 
1914 
Ensure 
friendly 
govt., 
prevent 
rival canal 
in Nicaragua 
Topple 
Huerta govt. 
Success Major No Weak No 
Success Major No None No 
TABLE 1 continued 
War 
6. Villa 
punitive 
expedition 
1916 
U.S. 
Goal 
Destroy 
Villa, end 
threat to 
U.S. border 
Outcome 
Partial 
Success 
Friendly 
U.S. Adversary Local 
Power Interest Receives Aid Regime 
Major Yes None 
Involv 
With 
Allies 
No 
OS 
7. Dominican 
Republic 
Intervention 
1916-1922 
Pacify 
country 
prevent 
European 
Intervention 
Success Peripheral No Weak No 
Caco 
War in Haiti 
1918-19 
Pacify 
country 
prevent 
European 
Intervention 
Success Peripheral No Weak No 
9. Russian 
Intervention 
1918-19 
Topple 
Boshevik 
govt., guard 
supplies 
Failure Peripheral No Weak Yes 
10. Second 
Nicaragua 
Intervention 
1927-33 
Ensure 
friendly 
govt., protect 
U.S. Business, 
destroy Sandino 
Partial 
Success 
Peripheral No Weak No 
TABLE 1 continued 
War 
10. Korean 
War 1950-
53 
U.S. 
Goal 
Preserve S. 
Korea, later 
to eliminate 
N. Korea 
Outcome 
Partial 
Success 
U.S. Adversary 
Power Interest Receives Aid 
iendly 
seal 
:gime 
Inv 
Wit 
Alli 
Peripheral Yes Weak Yes 
12. Vietnam 
1961-72 
Preserve non-
communist 
govt, in S. 
Vietnam 
Failure Peripheral Yes Weak Yes 
- J 
13. Second Prevent 
Dominican Communist 
Intervention takeover 
1965-66 
Success Peripheral No Weak Yes 
14. "Peace Create 
keeping" in strong pro-
Lebanon, Lebanese 
1982-84 govt. 
Failure Peripheral Yes Weak Yes 
15. Grenada 
Invasion 
1983 
Topple 
Communist 
govt. 
Success Peripheral Yes 
(minimal) 
None Yes 
*Moros sometimes used guerrilla tactics 
**OAS units after several months 
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troops were sent into action against the Bolsheviks by a British general 
without his approval.2' Years of European involvement in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic led to Wilson's interventions there, but in these 
cases the threat was "greatly exaggerated." Yet all these interventions, 
except the one in Russia, were at least partially successful. 
Post-World War II small wars show a similar pattern.30 The threat 
of a "second Cuba" in the Dominican Republic provided a plausible 
security justification for sending troops there in 1965, but the degree of 
Communist influence in the Dominican revolution appears to have been 
overstated." Korea was seen by U.S. policy makers as having low 
strategic value before the North Korean attack.32 Vietnam was described 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954 as "devoid of decisive military objec-
tives."33 The domino theory justifying intervention there to protect other 
Asian nations does not seem to have been valid. The Reagan administra-
tion involvement in Lebanon seems to have arisen from an identification 
with the Israeli goal of a pro-Israel, Christian government in that coun-
try.34 Certainly America's position in the Middle East was diminished 
rather than enhanced by the failed intervention. Grenada, though 
located in an area important to the U.S., did not represent a serious 
security threat, even if its much discussed airport had been converted to 
military uses.35 
If Hypothesis 1 is correct, most of the fifteen interventions should 
have ended in failure, since they were not grounded in a major interest. 
However, the realist view is not confirmed by the facts. The U.S. was 
clearly sucessful in achieving its objectives in nine of the fifteen cases and 
partially successful in three others. Nine of these were instances where 
American interests were, by realist standards, peripheral. Only three 
times (Vietnam, Lebanon and Russia) did America withdraw without 
achieving any of its major goals. (One could argue that the Nixon ad-
ministration achieved its goal of a peace treaty in Vietnam but in view of 
later events this argument appears specious.) Contrary to Hypothesis 1, 
success or failure in small wars does not seem to hinge primarily upon 
whether a major interest is at stake. 
POWER TO THE PEOPLE? 
Five of the ten pre-1945 wars had such low visibility to the public 
that popular support or opposition had little meaning for policy makers. 
The First Dominican, First Nicaraguan, Haitian, Russian and Moro con-
flicts fall into this category.36 However, not all small wars during this 
period were invisible to the public; the Philippine War of 1899-1902 was 
highly visible, as were the Mexican involvements and the Second 
Nicaraguan intervention.37 After 1945, the development of mass media 
made all small wars visible. 
The record of ten visible small wars appears to support strongly 
Hypothesis 3 rather than Hypothesis 2. In four cases—Veracruz in 1914, 
the Boxer Rebellion in 1902, the Dominican Republic in 1965 and 
Grenada in 1983—the U.S. was quickly successful with light casualties. 
All four of these wars were popular. In both the Dominican Republic 
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and Grenada cases, the interventions were criticized by segments of the 
foreign policy elite and the mass media, but the people backed the presi-
dent's policies.38 
Three of the five unpopular wars—the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam 
and Lebanon—also fit Hypothesis 3; they started out popular, then lost 
support as costs and casualties rose. The relationship between casualty 
rates and opposition is clearly documented for Korea and Vietnam.3' The 
Philippines was also a costly war, claiming the lives of over 4,500 
Americans. Despite ultimate victory, it was probably even more un-
popular than Vietnam.40 
Three cases clearly do not fit Hypothesis 3. The Punitive Expedition 
against Villa in 1916-17 was popular despite an inconclusive outcome. 
However, in this case U.S. territory had actually been invaded and 
American civilians killed by Villa's forces. Moreover, casualties were not 
high.4' The Second Nicaragua intervention of 1927-33 aroused con-
sideration opposition, though only 47 Marines died in six years.42 Ap-
parently this was because the operation was seen by many as aimed at ad-
vancing selfish interests of some American business firms in Nicaragua.43 
The Lebanon "peace-keeping operation" was unpopular even before the 
bombing of the Marine barracks in October 1983, perhaps because of the 
vague explanations given for the mission and fear of another Vietnam.44 
Obviously many factors can make a war popular or unpopular and no 
one explanation fits all cases. Nonetheless, Hypothesis 3, that costly and 
inconclusive wars will be unpopular, appears well supported. 
Hypothesis 2, that unpopularity causes failure and popularity brings 
success, is less strongly supported. Despite its unpopularity, the Philip-
pines War ended in victory. Korea and the Second Nicaragua interven-
tion were partially successful. No popular war ended in defeat, however. 
This suggests that popular support is an important asset to American 
leaders pursuing a small war, but not as essential to victory as Sarkesian 
and others suggest. 
WHAT KIND OF WAR? 
Eight of the fifteen small wars involved basically conventional 
military operations. Of these, the U.S. was successful in six and partially 
successful in one. Only one conventional operation, Russia in 1917-18, 
appears a clear failure. 
In the other seven cases, the U.S. faced a guerrilla warfare situation. 
Here, there were only three successes, all before World War II. The op-
ponent's weaknesses clearly played a role here; the Dominican and Hai-
tian insurgents were poorly equipped and ill-organized.45 Two other 
pre-1945 guerrilla wars (the Punitive Expedition and Second Nicaragua) 
were partially successful. Vietnam and Lebanon were very different 
situations, one a large rural guerrilla war and the other an encounter with 
urban terrorism. Both were unconventional conflicts and both were 
American failures. 
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Given recurrent U.S. security needs, it is understandable that guer-
rilla warfare should have a lower priority. As one scholar points out, 
"Tactics, technologies and operational concepts that work well in wars 
in the Third World may bear no relation at all to wars elsewhere."46 
Since the greatest threats to the security of the United States and its allies 
are nuclear or conventional wars, large and small, a wholesale reorienta-
tion of U.S. force structure, tactics and doctrine toward counterin-
surgent warfare is impossible. However, the record clearly shows the 
need to upgrade and develop counterinsurgent capabilities and expertise, 
unless intervention in such conflicts is to be foresworn altogether. 
WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE, DO WE NEED ENEMIES? 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that the U.S. gets into trouble in small wars 
when it supports a weak local regime. The historical record shows that 
U.S. supported regimes in small wars were weak. In fact, all of the 
regimes America has supported have been weak, except when there was 
no friendly local government at all, as in the Philippines, China in the 
Boxer Rebellion, or Grenada. 
The infirmities of the South Vietnamese government have already 
been discussed, but the Saigon regime could be compared favorably with 
some other American clients. Marines training the National Guard in 
Nicaragua in the 1920s complained that their recruits seemed primarily 
interested in "locking up everybody they had a grudge against or who 
would not turn over to them a little graft."'17 The Guard was plagued by 
mutiny and a high desertion rate with only a few units become effective 
against the Sandino forces. The Haitian regime installed by Wilson in 
1915 and the Domincan government created a year later brought order 
and improved social services to their countries but, because of their 
foreign backing, failed to win significant popular support. Both were 
replaced by repressive military regimes after the U.S. withdrew.48 White 
Russian troops fighting beside Americans in 1918-19 were unreliable and 
frequently deserted to the Bolsheviks.49 Perhaps the best of America's 
local allies were the South Koreans in 1950-53, yet even they were fre-
quently unable to hold against Chinese and North Korean assaults.50 
In some cases the U.S. may have been better off without local allies. 
In the Philippines War, for example, the military won over many 
Filipinos from the nationalist forces by instituting social reforms and ex-
tending health and education services to the people.51 These policies 
might have been more difficult to carry out if the Americans had been 
defending an entrenched local elite like the one in South Vietnam. The 
intervention in Grenada won the support of the Grenadian people 
because it ousted a repressive government rather than sustained one.52 
Altogether, in those cases where the U.S. intervened without any 
local allies it was successful four times and partially successful twice. 
With allies, there were still four successes and one partial success, but 
also three failures—Russia, Vietnam and Lebanon. In all three cases, the 
weakness of the local regime clearly contributed heavily to the failure. 
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Do these results indicate that America generally does a poor job of 
picking its friends? Perhaps, but not necessarily. This study is concerned 
only with regimes that needed direct American military assistance against 
an internal or external threat. The stronger an ally is, the more able it is 
to handle a security threat on its own or with U.S. arms and economic 
assistance. For example, the U.S. aid helped several governments in 
Latin America in the 1960s to repel leftist challenges.53 Thus, one cannot 
demonstrate that U.S. aid is typically futile or counterproductive. 
However, the record suggests that if a regime cannot stand without a 
direct U.S. military involvement, serious thought should be given to li-
quidating the commitment, as was done with Chiang-Kai-Shek in China 
in the late 1940s, Batista in Cuba in 1958 and Somoza in Nicaragua in 
1979. In all these cases the outcome was unfavorable, but direct U.S. in-
volvement might well have produced a similar result at far greater cost. 
THE IMPACT OF ENEMIES 
Only one of the ten small wars before 1945 saw any significant aid to 
America's adversaries. This occurred during the Punitive Expedition 
against Villa in 1916-17, when the Germans provided arms to Villa and 
urged the Mexican government to go to war with the U.S. In the five 
wars since 1945, the adversary received aid in four, though in the case of 
Grenada the aid could not be called significant. Clearly there is an in-
creasing tendency for U.S. adversaries to receive assistance from outside 
powers. 
This trend may be explained by the emergence of a bipolar interna-
tional political system after World War II. As Kenneth Waltz has 
pointed out, in a bipolar world any initiative by either superpower tends 
to attract the attention and opposition of the other and/or its allies.54 
This is particularly true when a superpower commits its forces to a small 
war, allowing the other to score points against it at minimal cost by 
aiding the other side. U.S., as well as Soviet behavior, confirm Waltz's 
theory: aid to the Afghan guerrillas is but the latest in a series of 
American efforts to aid anti-communist guerrillas, some in the Soviet 
Union itself.55 
Hypothesis 6 suggests that external-aid for an adversary will reduce 
the chances for American success in a small war. The data confirm the 
hypothesis. In eight of ten cases where the adversary received no aid 
from another power the U.S. succeeded. One, Second Nicaragua, was a 
partial success, and one, Russia, a failure. Of the five cases where the 
adversary did receive outside help, only one, Grenada in 1983, was a 
clear-cut U.S. success. Outside aid was most important in the Korean 
and Vietnam conflicts but also played a role in Lebanon where the 
Syrians and Iranians supported attacks on the Marines.56 Pancho Villa 
probably would have been destroyed without German aid and might 
have been destroyed anyway except for U.S. entry into World War I.57 
It should be noted that aid to the adversary does not always lead to a 
negative result. In the Korean war the U.S. accomplished its original ob-
jective—preserving South Korea—but failed when it attempted to 
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eliminate the North Korean regime, provoking Chinese intervention. On 
the other hand, the Grenada intervention did not provoke a major 
response from adversaries because the U.S. had an overwhelming 
military advantage and because its actions did not threaten important 
Soviet interests. Whether American entry into a small war will produce 
effective counteraction by the Soviets or some other power may depend 
on the place and purpose of the intervention. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 6, help from allies did not make up for 
outside aid to the adversary. In fact, the U.S. has actually done worse 
when it intervened with allies than without them. Allied help was 
available in seven of the fifteen cases; three of these were successes, three 
failures, and one a partial success. Without allies, the U.S. had six suc-
cesses, two partial success and no failures. Moreover, the allied contribu-
tion was decisive in only one successful case, the Boxer Rebellion of 
1900. Americans made up only 10% of the 25,000-man force which 
relieved the legations in Beijing and crushed the Boxers.58 
It seems paradoxical that allied support would contribute little to a 
successful outcome. Yet, upon reflection, it is consistent with what is 
known about the nature of alliance relationships. Nations typically align 
with one another to balance the threatening power of another state." In 
a small war situation, no such impulse to cooperate exists because the 
military power of the U.S. is vastly superior to that of the adversary. 
Defeat will not be the result of inadequate resources but of other factors. 
Hence, allies can contribute only modestly to the military effort, though 
their very presence may have political and propaganda effects. At the 
same time, they introduce the inevitable quarrels, constraints and com-
plications present in alliance relationships. 
The Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon in 1982-84 illustrates 
some of the problems which can arise. Americans, French and Italian 
troops made up the force. The Americans, who wanted to establish a 
pro-Israeli, Christian-dominated government in Lebanon, pushed for a 
coordinated response to attacks by the Muslim and Druse militia but 
were rebuffed by their allies. The Italians, who became involved out of 
humanitarian concern for the Palestinian refugees in Beirut, were not at-
tacked by the irregulars and showed no desire to confront them. The 
French, as the former colonial power, wanted to restore order but did 
not share Washington's enthusiasm for the minority Gemayel govern-
ment. With conflicting political objectives "each contingent tended to 
fight its own separate war."60 Similar problems surfaced in other wars, 
notably in Korea and Russia.61 
CONCLUSIONS 
Clearly, the factors that make for success or failure in a small war 
are complicated. Only tenative judgements may be made from the ex-
perience of the past. Nevertheless, some conclusions seem warranted. 
First, the risks of small war involvement are significant and rising. The 
U.S. has had great difficulty in small guerrilla wars, and this difficulty 
increases when the adversary receives outside assistance. Such assistance 
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is more likely now that America is a superpower in a bipolar world. 
Allies may do the U.S. more harm than good and small wars are often 
peripheral to American strategic interests. 
On the other hand, small wars are by no means destined to end in a 
Vietnam-style morass. Where guerrilla warfare is impossible, as in 
Grenada, or where the adversary is unable to obtain outside assistance, 
prospects for success are higher. Contrary to the fears of many policy 
makers, public opinion is unlikely to prevent successful prosecution of a 
small war. Rather, the public reacts to military success or failure in form-
ing its opinions. 
Can this analysis be used to predict the results of a future small war 
and help policy makers manage or avoid the conflict? Only with the 
greatest caution, for each event is unique and the relative importance of 
each variable will change from case to case. However, reference to the 
framework presented here may help in assessing policy options. For ex-
ample, direct intervention in Central America seems a hazardous course. 
Given the geography and politics of the region, any war there would pro-
bably develop into a protracted guerrilla conflict with the Sandinistas 
receiving aid from the U.S.S.R., Cuba and possibly other Latin 
American states. U.S. local allies, the contras and the non-Communist 
governments in the region, clearly have their weaknesses. The analysis 
seems to support the decision to avoid a direct confrontation with 
Nicaragua, whatever other means are employed to deal with the San-
dinista regime. 
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